Introduction
For many years, official projections of household formation have provided the basis for regional and local housing plans. In turn, official projections are based on expected population distributions by age, marital status and gender and detailed estimates of headship rates or household representative rates, HRR, for each group. However, the HRRs are trend projections, based on census and Labour Force Survey data, and do not take into account structural changes in economic or institutional conditions that may change past trends. In particular, the projections do not attempt to capture the effects of In fact, a simple national number count is over-simplistic. First, it takes no account of spatial patterns or current shortages/surpluses. Second, it takes no account of the market.
In some sense, the household projections are an estimate of future need not market demand. Potential shortages can be eliminated by price adjustment, although there may, of course, be undesirable social externalities, for example overcrowding, leading to wider social pathologies. It is because of the externalities that housing is considered a merit good and successive governments have made a commitment to decent housing, although the form of the commitment has varied over time. Third, a number count takes no account of housing quality; all units are considered equivalent, although four-bedroom detached houses in the suburbs yield a different level of housing services from an urban two-room flat.
There are no official estimates of the expected distribution of households by tenure, although this is clearly important for the planning of social housing provision.
Furthermore, private rental investors in the so-called Buy-to-Let market need estimates of likely future demand. The government also has an aspiration to raise the owneroccupation rate; consequently, it needs estimates of the expected outcome under existing economic conditions and constraints. But, whereas the provision of a decent home, independently of a household's economic circumstances, may be justified as a merit good, the same issue does not hold with tenure; the tenure distribution is largely a market outcome and, arguably, governments should attempt to maintain tenure neutrality in terms of intervention, unless there are associated externalities. It has been suggested, for example, that home-ownership has positive externalities by raising neighbourhood quality, since neighbourhood quality is capitalised into house prices, e.g. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) , Rohe et al (2002) . Alternatively, ownership may have negative macro externalities if it reduces labour mobility.
Amongst the many recommendations of the Barker Review of Housing Supply (Barker, 2004) was the call for the adoption of affordability targets at the national and regional level. This recognised that the planning system is currently unresponsive to market price signals and argued that more land needed to be brought forward if affordability worsened beyond some, undefined, target level. Although Barker did not recommend a single affordability indicator, in accepting the recommendations, the Government is concentrating on the ratio of lower quartile house prices to earnings.
What has not been widely recognised, however, is that affordability targets have profound implications for traditional approaches to modelling household formation and housing need. It is no longer possible to rely on extrapolations of past trends for HRRs.
The aim of affordability targets is to change those past trends. Similarly, affordability targets imply that matching housing construction levels to the number of households is no longer adequate. In this paper, we demonstrate, that typically this will not stabilise affordability. Generally, net additions to the housing stock, which include conversions and changes in property uses, as well as new construction, would have to be higher than the number of new households in order to account for the higher demand for housing services by existing households as their incomes rise over time. The Barker proposals have been attacked as implying that large amounts of Greenfield land in the South would need to be covered. Furthermore it has been suggested that the proposals would contribute to the decline of city centres. In fact, as we attempt to demonstrate, neither of these criticisms is valid since neither is necessarily implied by affordability targets.
However, regional affordability targets do require the greater use of formal econometric models. In particular, estimates are needed of:
The responsiveness of house prices (and, therefore, affordability) to increases in housing construction. This, in turn, requires estimates of the income and price elasticities of housing demand.
The responsiveness of household formation to improvements in affordability. (iii) The responsiveness of regional migration flows to relative affordability differentials.
Meen (2005) concentrated on (i) and, here, the emphasis is on (ii). The likely tenure distribution of households requires a further range of elasticities. More precisely:
The responsiveness of tenure to relative cost differentials (ii)
The impact of credit market constraints (iii) The effects of supply shortages Once again, however, affordability targets imply that simple extrapolations of past trends are no longer adequate. Section 2 considers the traditional approach to projecting household numbers and compares the estimates to the most recent regional plans for net additions to the housing stock. Section 3 develops an alternative formal model of household formation and tenure choice, more appropriate to the post-Barker framework. As noted above, past trends cannot be simply extrapolated since the aim of the targets is to change the trends. In Section 4, the model addresses the issue of the expected outcome for household formation under market outcomes. But this does not necessarily imply that household formation will meet the official estimates. Section 5 uses the model to discuss a number of current policy questions, for example the possibility of raising home-ownership rates and home-ownership sustainability. We also discuss the implications of increasing housing supply in the light of the Barker Review. This includes the commonly-expressed view that England does not need large numbers of new homes because of existing vacancies and the contentious issue of demolitions. This leads on to a brief consideration of city regeneration versus Greenfield new building. Section 6 draws conclusions.
The Traditional Approach
The most recent English national and regional projections of household formation use, as a starting point, estimates of population in 2004. The projections look ahead to 2029; national figures are summarised in Table 1 and the regional disaggregations in Table 2 and 2021 (the equivalent figure for 1996-2021 on the latest projections is 400,000). For 2021, the estimates of total households are now almost 1 million higher than in the 1996-based projections. Therefore, there has been an upward drift in the official projections over time. Second, the outturn for household formation over the last ten years was considerably over-estimated by the 1996-based household projections. This overprediction coincided with a worsening of housing affordability. Third, Table 1 , as Table 2 shows, the increases are concentrated in the South at least in absolute terms. Power and Houghton (2007, page 139), using 1996-based household figures show shortages of new building relative to household formation in the southern regions, but excess supplies of construction in the Midlands and, particularly, the northern regions. This pattern is unlikely to have changed on the basis of the latest household projections. These six points enter into the later discussion. As noted above, the HRRs underlying Tables 1 and 2 are projected on the basis of past trends. Therefore, implicitly, they assume that the factors determining HRRs also continue their previous trends. For example, the literature indicates that the probability that any individual will form a separate household is related both to demographic characteristics and to housing affordability (Andrew and Meen 2003) . Consequently, official projections assume that affordability continues over the future at a similar position to the past. But the aim of the Barker affordability targets is to change and improve past trends. Other things equal, this would raise HRRs relative to past trends.
Furthermore, Section 3 suggests that, should the Barker proposals be unsuccessful in raising the supply of housing services, affordability could worsen relative to the past.
Under either scenario, an extrapolation of past HRRs is not appropriate. We have already noted that an extrapolation of trends from a 1996 base led to an over-prediction of households. The paper demonstrates later that the official estimates are a special case under particular assumptions concerning affordability. Table   4 . But, even taking this expected increase into account, prima facie there is a case for a system that is more immediately responsive to market pressures. Nationally, equation (1) Equation (1) is sometimes used to justify matching construction targets to the expected rate of household formation, since second homes, vacancies and demolitions have historically been small and stable in proportion to the housing stock. But in a market system subject to affordability targets, the argument is inadequate. First, an important reason why vacancies and demolitions have been low has been housing shortages and consequent poor affordability. If housing costs are high, the opportunity cost of holding properties vacant is also high. Similarly, if shortages keep house prices artificially high, the average duration of property lives increases. But, under affordability targets, where higher rates of new construction are likely, we would expect to observe accompanying higher levels of vacancies and demolitions as part of the market adjustment. Second, although (1) has to hold in terms of units, it takes no account of housing quality. As demonstrated in the next section, even if HS=HH affordability will typically worsen, because existing households will demand higher quantities of housing services as their incomes rise. If the stock of services is inelastic, the real price of houses rises in equilibrium over time. The point is that in a world of affordability targets, matching numbers of households to numbers of units is no longer sufficient. In the next section, a model is developed for housing planning more appropriate to the attainment of affordability objectives. This is a system that is more responsive to market pressures than the current plan-based approach, but recognises the role of housing as a merit good and government objectives to provide access to decent housing.
An Alternative Approach
The section begins with a model, which defines a set of outcomes that might occur if housing decisions were determined entirely by market processes. A simplified version is portrayed in Figure 1 . In the figure, the econometric relationships to be modelled are given on the left-hand side -these cover inter-regional migration, the probability that any individual will form a separate household, tenure choice and the demand for housing services. The remainder of the figure defines the central aggregate outcomes -the total number of households, the allocation of total households across the tenures, house prices, rents and affordability, and vacancies/demolitions/second homes. Importantly, all the variables on the left-hand side could be affected by changes in affordability and, therefore, there is a link back to these variables from the aggregate level of affordability (dotted line), where affordability is determined by market clearing processes.
Furthermore, if the future trend in affordability changes relative to the past, all the variables in the model are affected.
The two boxes at the top and bottom of the figure define sets of variables that are determined outside the structure of the model. These include the population at the end of the previous year (t-1), births, deaths, international migration and average earnings. The latter is the denominator in the government's chosen definition of affordability (the ratio of average house prices to earnings). There is evidence that earnings are affected by housing market variables (e.g. Bover et al 1989, Blackaby and Manning 1992) , but this extension is ignored here. Similarly births, deaths and international migration may all be affected by housing affordability, but we judge the likely elasticities to be fairly low and the central ideas can be illustrated without the addition.
The bottom left-hand corner gives the supply of owner-occupier services. Although it might be expected that the variable would be responsive to changes in house prices, across the English regions, Meen (2006) indicates that the price elasticity of new housing supply has fallen close to zero since the nineties. In the model, the supply of services is treated as a policy instrument. In the Barker Review context, if affordability worsens beyond a given target, further construction is brought on to the market. Note that "new housing" is stated in italics above. This emphasises the fact that services can be increased not only by new building, but also by conversions and renovations of the existing stock.
The equations in the left-hand column employ a combination of micro and aggregate data. The probabilities of household formation and tenure choice are estimated on individual data from the British Household Panel Survey, whereas the inter-regional migration and owner-occupier housing service demand equations 1 use regional timeseries information. In each of the central equations affordability is an important determinant, but not the only influence. Therefore, Table 6 sets out the main  2 influences for each. The equations are discussed briefly in the following sub-sections, but it is helpful to begin with the demand for housing services since it highlights a common fallacy that is critical for achieving affordability targets. 
Inter-regional Migration
Relative house prices, housing availability, relative earnings, unemployment.
The Demand for Owner-Occupier Housing Services
As discussed in the last section, the traditional planning approach attempts to relate housing construction to the expected future number of households. But it is not the case that this will necessarily stabilise affordability. The fallacy lies in treating all units as identical, whereas different houses, in fact, contain different levels of housing services.
Consider the following housing services demand function (2), which is representative of the literature. 
where H s = Supply of housing services
If a 3 = 1 (i.e. the demand for housing services rises proportionately to the number of households), then equation (3) can be simplified to (4).
In (4) implies that the income elasticity of housing demand is higher than the price elasticity.
Both the above time-series studies find this to be the case. In our model, the income elasticity is approximately one and the price elasticity -0.5, so (a 1 /a 2 ) = 2. Therefore, affordability worsens over time unless the supply of housing services rises faster than the number of households or some other market stabiliser operates, for example, changes in interest rates. But, of course, house prices are only one of the factors taken into account by the Bank of England in setting interest rates.
In terms of the underlying economics, the equation implies that, as incomes rise, existing households demand a higher quantity of housing services than they currently hold. This might imply bigger houses in better neighbourhoods, for example. It may also involve a tenure change. The model, therefore, introduces a form of filtering of the housing stock, where higher income households move to higher quality homes and the homes they vacate filter down to those further down the income distribution. Equation (4) determines house prices in the model. But to determine the distribution of households between tenures, assumptions are needed concerning relative housing costs in each tenure. Because of past constraints on private rents and the administered nature of social rent setting, it is not appropriate to estimate the relationships from historical data, since most of the private rented sector is now uncontrolled. In a pure market system, it is more relevant to assume a direct relationship between the three tenure prices. In a longterm setting, failure to do so will imply that all households will choose the cheapest sector, for a property of a given quality, in the absence of other constraints (e.g. supply shortages).
The Probability of Forming Separate Households
Given the distribution of population by age, gender, marital status, number of children and income, the expected total number of households of each type can be obtained, using the probability that individuals with each of the above characteristics will form a separate household. Formally, these can be estimated from a probit model, using data from the British Household Panel Survey. Unsurprisingly, those with the highest incomes are more likely to form separate households, but in line with the literature (see Bramley et al 1997) , the responsiveness of household formation to economic variables -both incomes and prices -is fairly weak. The demographic influences are quantitatively much larger.
By contrast, in the tenure equations discussed below, economic factors are more important than demographics. As a generalisation, demographics determine household formation, but economics determines the tenure distribution.
Whether an individual currently lives in an independent household depends on her status in the previous year. If she is already in a separate household, there is a high probability that she will remain as a separate household. Alternatively, there is a low probability that she will return to the parental home. By contrast, individuals who were previously living with parents have a relatively low probability of forming a new household. In other words, households exhibit a high degree of persistence and changes in income or housing costs, for example, typically do not immediately lead to a change in status. However, persistence leads to differential responses to changes in affordability across the regions.
The largest differences are in London. Because London has a young age distribution, a smaller percentage of individuals have already formed separate households.
Consequently a worsening of affordability means that they remain with parents for longer. The elasticity of household formation with respect to affordability is relatively high. By contrast, regions that have older age distributions will have a higher percentage of residents already in separate households. Given persistence, a worsening of affordability is unlikely to persuade many households to give up their independent status. Therefore, the elasticity of household formation with respect to affordability is relatively weak. Table 7 shows how household formation probabilities vary across individuals in London.
The second half of the table shows that, whatever the demographic status, if the individual was previously in a separate household, she is likely to maintain that status.
Income (and housing costs, although not shown in the table) has little influence.
Alternatively shocks would have to be large to induce a change in status, for example through divorce. But the first half of the table shows that the probabilities of household formation are much lower for individuals, who were not previously independent. The response to economic change (rows 4 and 5) is much larger. Consequently, regions that have high percentages of the young, who have not already formed separate households, will be more affected by variations in economic conditions. 
Housing Tenure
The model determines the probability that a household with any of the characteristics given in Table 6 will be an owner-occupier, private or social renter. Although the socalled Buy-to-Let market has added only 1.5 percentage points to the national housing stock (4 percentage points in London), the importance of the rise in the sector is that it provides a realistic alternative to owner-occupation for certain household types, namely young, relatively high income groups, who require a high degree of mobility.
Consequently, the responsiveness to changes in the relative costs of the different tenures might be expected to be high.
However, there are constraints on tenure choice. The most important is access to credit.
Since the early nineties the average age of entry to home-ownership has fallen sharply.
Although a number of factors have contributed to the decline, including the improvements in the private rental sector and changes in the income distribution, the increase in the required deposit stands out. For first-time buyers, the average deposit as a percentage of the purchase price reached a maximum of 23% in 2003, compared with an average of 12.5% between 1988 and 1997. Consequently, even if relative tenure costs favour ownership, an inability to raise the required deposit is expected to extend the period in the private rented sector. Note, however, that credit restrictions generally delay ownership rather than permanently change tenure choice. Households have to save longer to attain ownership.
Although economic factors are central to the determination of the tenure distribution, Section 2 noted that official household projections indicate only a small percentage of the increase in households will be amongst the under 35s -the main demographic group that is attracted to private renting. Therefore, on the basis of demographic factors alone, a drift away from private renting might be expected. Of course, this could be offset by changes in relative prices and the credit restrictions discussed above.
A second constraint arises from housing supply and this is particularly important in the social sector. Even if households would prefer to live in social housing, shortages in the sector and the administrative allocation system mean that first choices cannot necessarily be met. In the model, constraints of this form mean that households who do not meet the eligibility criteria are forced into the low-cost part of the private rented sector.
Constraints bite more strongly in the southern regions than in the North or Midlands, where areas of low demand exist. Low income households with children are consequently more likely to be housed in social housing.
As in the household formation equations, the probabilities depend on tenure in the previous year. Once again there is a high degree of persistence. Consequently, for two households with identical characteristics, a household who was an owner last year will have a higher probability of being an owner in the current year. As an illustration, Table   8a sets out, for a sample of household types, the estimated ownership probabilities in the South East. The second column indicates that previous owners are highly likely to maintain their status irrespective of demographic profile. But the probability that a household who was previously a renter becomes an owner is fairly sensitive to income. 
Inter-Regional Migration
The inter-regional migration equations are estimated at the aggregate level on time-series data. Therefore, the model does not consider the probability that a household with given characteristics will move between regions. The variables included as determinants of migration flows are conventional and cover those normally found to be important in the literature. These include relative house prices, housing availability, relative unemployment and earnings. Therefore, a combination of housing and labour market influences are taken into account. Here, the emphasis is on the housing market.
As shown in the simulations below, migration flows limit the scope for affordability targeting. Suppose, for example, that the supply of housing was increased in the South East alone in order to improve affordability. As relative prices begin to fall in the South East, out-migration from other regions would be expected to increase, particularly out of London, worsening the current long-run trend towards the South East. Therefore, the initial improvement in South East affordability would be offset. The problem becomes more evident, the finer the spatial scale of targeting. At the local authority level, the population flows are likely to be so great that it becomes impossible to meet a target, since local authorities lie within wider travel-to-work areas.
Household Formation Under Market Outcomes
The official 2004-based household projections set out in Table 1 are trend based and may suggest housing shortages could occur under current RPG figures. Under a market-based solution, increases in housing costs would be expected to restore equilibrium by reducing household formation, although, as noted earlier, this is likely to generate wider social costs.
This section compares possible market solutions for household formation with the official projections. However, it is convenient to begin with projections from the model in Figure   1 under an assumption that real housing costs remain approximately constant until 2029.
But, from the analysis in equations (2)- (4) Table 9 imply housing shortages, since house prices are not market clearing. By contrast, Table 10 shows similar information assuming market clearing, although the table concentrates on the stock of households (rather than net flows) in the final year of the official projections. The projections are, however, based on a particularly important assumption. As in Section 3.1, rents -both private and social are assumed to rise in line with owner-occupier housing costs. Since affordability rises sharply, unsurprisingly, relatively few new households can afford to form.
By 2029 the difference between official and market projections is 4 million or 15% and the differences are concentrated on the southern regions, where the affordability problems are worst. In other words, the housing shortages are most severe in these regions and, therefore, in a market driven system, the households cannot form. The figures imply a rise in the average household size in the South East from 2.35 in 2004 to 2.45 in 2029.
Official projections suggest a continuation in the decline in average household size to 2.12. Arguably, Table 10 reflects an unrealistic worst case scenario, but it illustrates (i) how strongly the housing system relies on social support and (ii) the dangers of assuming that past trends will continue. It was noted in Table 3 that past official projections overestimated the outturn during the nineties. It may be the case that current official projections will again over-estimate the outcome, because of a failure to allow sufficiently for affordability changes.
Nevertheless, despite these warnings, we would not want to argue that the model results in Table 10 are the most likely outcome -the model simply provides a framework for thought, which allows for affordability changes, although household formation could well be below official estimates. The social implications of a rise in household size are likely to be severe and would probably not meet the government commitment that "everyone should have the opportunity of a decent home at a price they can afford, in a place in which they want to live and work". Furthermore, the results rely on social housing costs rising in line with house prices, which, in turn, imply an unrealistic excess supply of social homes. In practice, the majority of social tenants and low income private renters would be receiving housing benefits, so the costs they face would be lower or zero and household formation would be correspondingly higher than in Table 10 . But this, of course, has implications for the benefits bill.
Policy Questions
In this section a selection of current policy issues is considered. First, the paper discusses the difficulties of raising homeownership rates, given that home-ownership rates in
England have barely changed from 70% over the past five years. The discussion is tied up with the more general question of home-ownership sustainability. Second, the paper examines the impact of increasing housing supply, a recommendation of the Barker Review. We attempt to dispel some popular fallacies arising from the Report. For example, the Report does not necessarily imply large amounts of new building on Greenfield sites, nor the break up of urban communities. Nor does the Review imply the demolition of Victorian terraces. The criticism that there are already enough dwellings to meet demand is also found not to be valid. Third, the section discusses the feasibility of achieving affordability targets.
It is useful to begin with an examination of expected tenure shares implied by Tables 9 (constant real housing costs) and Table 10 (worsening affordability). To recap, despite the uncertainties surrounding long-run projections, Table 9 suggests household numbers similar to official projections, whereas by 2029 -assuming rents rise in line with house prices -households are approximately 4 million lower than official estimates in Table 10 .
The 4 million represent households who fail to form because they cannot meet the market rent. However, as we have stressed, there are strong social reasons why these households need to form, given the role of housing as a merit good. In the following, therefore, we assume that the 4 million do form, but at subsidised housing costs in the rental sectors.
Formally, the 4 million are allocated, first, to the social sector up to the point at which shortages occur (allowing for vacancies) and the remainder are allocated to the private rented sector. In the bottom half of Table 11 , therefore, housing "need", as represented by official household projections, is met (rather than effective demand), but through the rental sectors. The two halves of the table, therefore, are based on similar household numbers. The tenure shares in Table 11 , concentrate on an intermediate year, 2015, since the aspirations to raise ownership rates are well before 2029. Under constant real housing costs, for England as a whole in 2015, the model implies that the ownership rate might be approximately 72% 3 compared with 70% currently.
Therefore, even without a worsening of affordability, there is likely to be work to do to extend ownership towards 75%, as mentioned in the Government's response to the Barker Review of Housing Supply, perhaps through a combination of Right to Buy Sales, shared ownership or a relaxation of credit conditions. But, under worsening affordability, Table 11 implies that home-ownership might change little from current rates. The difference between the two scenarios arises because low income groups can no longer From equation (4), stabilisation of affordability requires the supply of housing services to rise faster than the number of households. As noted above, the simulations in Table 10 imply that affordability worsens sharply between 2006 and 2029. Although too much emphasis should, perhaps, not be placed on the precise numbers, since any projections including house prices are subject to large margins of error, the implications of the analysis are clear. Therefore, the effects of increasing the supply of housing services are considered next. Although the supply of services could be expanded through renovation of the existing stock, the simulations make net additions to the stock. These could be through a combination of new building, conversions or changes in use. The annualised RPG targets in Table 4 provide the baseline, on top of which a further 50,000 dwellings per annum are added, spread proportionately over the four southern regions, where shortages are greatest. However, before conducting the simulations, the expected outcomes can be seen analytically. Rewriting equation (4) as (5):
The coefficient values arise directly from the earlier analysis. Given the growth in real to rise by 1.25% per annum more than the increase in households. But, from Table 6 , the number of households in any region is negatively related to affordability (6): The Introduction pointed to 3 key elasticities that determine the outcomes. The first has already been discussed, whereas equation (6) brings together the second and third. The model outcomes are summarised in Table 12 Also, from Table 12 , the migration flows are limited; this is because the increase in construction is "balanced" across the southern regions, so the relative price effects are small. The migration figures are not directly comparable with those in the previous column, which refer to households rather than population. Table 13 repeats the simulation, but construction is only increased in the South East. In this case, migration and the increase in households are greater, but the improvement in affordability is more modest. More generally, this suggests that spatial targeting at fine levels is difficult.
Within travel-to-work areas, for example, population flows offset attempts to improve affordability through increases in construction. Tables 12 and 13 are in terms of net additions to the stock. Although, from Table 5 , a high percentage of net additions have historically been through new construction, conversions and changes in use also make a significant contribution and could potentially be extended. The main requirement, as this paper stresses, is the need to increase the volume of housing services to meet the increased demands over time of existing households, rather than increasing the number of units.
Second, there is a suggestion that the Barker proposals involve high levels of demolitions of older (predominantly Victorian terrace) properties. As Table 5 is that any demolitions should be based on market valuations and concepts of economic obsolescence rather than age per se. Since the older parts of the stock have an urban bias, it is not the case that demolitions necessarily involve inner city destruction.
A further criticism is that high levels of new building are not required because England already has a high level of vacant properties that could be brought back into use.
Although international comparisons are difficult, Evans and Hartwich (2005) approximately 3.5% of the housing stock, of which 1.8% had been vacant for more than six months. In a freely operating housing market, a certain level of vacancies is necessary as part of the transactions process and, therefore, the scope for reducing vacancies further may be limited. Indeed, they may need to be higher if the opportunity cost declines under affordability target.
Finally, it has been argued that large increases in the number of homes would exceed official household projections. Furthermore, Table 12 implies that few of the increase in homes go to new households. However, once again, the key concept is the increase in housing services, rather than the number of units. Nevertheless, it is likely that the increase in services would have to be met partly from an increase in units and, given that equation (1) must hold, the point is valid. However, equation (1) also stresses that equilibrium can be restored not only by an increase in households, but also through a rise in second homes, vacancies, or demolitions. The fact that each of these has, historically, been fairly small is a reflection of past housing supply shortages and each would be expected to be part of the adjustment in a market system. This process would involve a filtering of the housing stock down through income groups. As already discussed, the lowest valued parts of the housing stock would be demolished, but to stress the point, this
is not necessarily older units within cities.
Conclusions
Taking into account affordability requires changes to the traditional planning approach, where housing net additions are closely allied to expected, trend-based household formation. In particular, estimates have to take into account the effects of changes in affordability on the demand for housing services by existing households and the fact that targets are likely to change the historical trend formation rates for new households.
Although the externalities associated with housing and government objectives for decent homes continue to mean that housing cannot be entirely treated as a pure marketdetermined outcome, affordability targets imply that greater account has to be taken of market processes than in the past as part of the planning process.
The paper shows that matching household formation and the number of new homes in terms of units is not sufficient to stabilise affordability, measured by the ratio of house prices to earnings. The provision of household services would have to rise at a faster rate.
Alternatively, if affordability worsens, then household formation would be lower than implied by official projections unless low income households continue to be subsidised in the social or private rental sectors. It is noticeable that past projections of household formation during the nineties over-estimated the increase, possibly due to worsening affordability, whereas projections for the future have been revised upwards. Worsening affordability also implies that it becomes difficult to raise significantly rates of homeownership. Increases in shared ownership and/or relaxation of credit conditions, typically, change the timing of entry to home-ownership rather than the long-run sustainable level.
The paper also suggests that the Barker proposals to increase housing to improve affordability do not necessarily imply covering large areas of the Green Belt, nor the demolition of good-quality Victorian homes, nor the decline of urban centres. The key is to increase the quality of the housing stock to raise the quantity of housing services. This can occur through a combination of new building, renovation, conversions and changes in use.
